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Much has already been written regarding the B-52 bomber that took off from an Air Force base in Minot, North Dakota in August with six nuclear-tipped AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missiles and then these missiles were transferred on a 1400-mile flight to the Air Force base in Barksdale, La. Of course, the missile tips should have been dummies, but somehow actual nuclear warheads were loaded for the cross-country trip. As Senator Carl Levin underscored during a hearing several weeks ago, "No one knew where they were, or even missed them, for over 36 hours."

Though the Air Force demoted and disciplined dozens and stressed that the missiles were not primed for actual use and could not have caused nuclear havoc, the lawmakers discovered a deeper underlying problem — a precipitous decrease in military vigilance over the nation's missile arsenal.
During the cold war, when the nation's nuclear arsenal was kept on a tense daily alert, it was managed by high-ranking senior officers and civilian specialists. In addition, the turning point of this diminished focus began when aircraft came off nuclear alert status. But that responsibility has traveled down the chain of command to Air Force colonels, Navy captains and civilians, a study found. This was the stark conclusion of a special Pentagon task force that recommended appointment of an assistant secretary of defense whose sole mission would be to manage the Pentagon's nuclear programs and restore operational acuteness.

As the New York Times said in an editorial: "The laxity on the home front uncovered by the dodgy B-52 flight presents the same kind of nuclear risk once epitomized by the cold war. The Pentagon should, without hesitation, reverse this dangerous perception by appointing the ranking watchdog plus a flag officer in each of the services to the sole task of keeping the missiles secure, as the study recommends."